Abstract. In a world where trusting software systems is increasingly important, formal methods and formal proof can help provide some basis for trust. Proof checking can help to reduce the size of the trusted base since we do not need to trust an entire theorem prover: instead, we only need to trust a (smaller and simpler) proof checker. Many approaches to building proof checkers require embedding within them a full programming language. In most modern proof checkers and theorem provers, that programming language is a functional programming language, often a variant of ML. In fact, aspects of ML (e.g., strong typing, abstract datatypes, and higherorder programming) were designed to make ML a trustworthy "meta-language" for checking proofs. While there is considerable overlap between logic programming and proof checking (e.g., both benefit from unification, backtracking search, efficient term structures, etc.), the discipline of logic programming has, in fact, played a minor role in the history of proof checking. I will argue that logic programming can have a major role in the future of this important topic.
Introduction
Today, a number of proof assistants are used in academics and industry and the tasks that they are formalizing are becoming increasingly complex and important. For example, computer systems such as Coq, HOL/Lite, and Isabelle have been used to help formally prove the four color theorem [Gon07] , the Kepler conjecture [Hal05] , and the correctness of a compiler [Ler09] and a micro kernel [KEH + 09] . For theorem provers to be part of our approach to trusting formalized mathematics and software systems, such provers must be trusted as well. However, trusting modern theorem provers is difficult since they usually evolving: stronger inference rules are added, implementations techniques are improved, and specialized proving technology are incorporated. Furthermore, one might not wish to require that theorem provers are formally trusted since anything that is formally validated has stopped evolving and is not generally subject to innovation and improvement.
• One of the philosophically motivated aspects of proofs must surely be their ability to communicate across time and space the reasons to trust that a formula is indeed true [Mil14] . Moving proof checkers outside a prover emphasizes that proofs are meant to be communicated, at least from prover to checker.
• When the kernel is part of a prover, there is a tendency for technology-specific aspects of a prover to find their way into the proof structures that are checked by its kernel. As a result, no independent (external) specification of correct proof is formally involved. Also, as provers evolve through different versions, proof checker must also evolve which complicates the task of formally trusting the proof checker.
• Finally, when the checker is formally separated from the prover, the structure of emitted proofs and the semantics of the kernel should become independent of the technology of the prover. Anyone could, therefore, reimplement the kernel and check the emitted proofs. Having several kernels implemented by several different teams provides a well recognized path to increasing trust in such software systems.
An example of an architecture for moving proof checking outside of theorem provers is currently being explored and implemented within the Dedukti system [Ded13] . Dedukti is based on the λ -modulo formal framework of Cousineau and Dowek [CD07] which mixes two well-known and powerful frameworks, one for hypothetical reasoning (via the dependently typed λ-calculus known as λ and as LF [HHP93] ) and one for functional programming style computations (via confluent rewriting). The Dedukti project has recently developed software that allows several existing theorem provers-e.g., Coq, HOL, Matita-to output proofs into a format that Dedukti can check independently from those provers [Ass15] .
Another example of how proof checking can be performed outside theorem provers by trusted proof checkers is being pursued in the ProofCert project [Mil11a] . Much of the rest of this paper presents key elements of the ProofCert approach to proof checking.
Proof checking vs proof reconstruction
What is typically called proof checking generally contains elements of proof reconstruction: that is, the process of checking whether or not a given document is a proof might require computing some details that are not present explicitly in the document. For example, even for rather low-level and detailed notions of proof, it is seldom the case that one would expect to have every detail present within a formal proof object. For example, in order to check that applying the rule of modus ponens (written schematically as "from A and A ⊃ B , conclude B ") to the assumptions (p ⊃ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) and (p ⊃ p ⊃ q) yields p ⊃ q, it is not likely that one needs to provide in the proof itself the explicit ordering of assumption and the binding of schematic variables
Such an ordering and binding can easily be computed, leaving less to store in the proof document.
Existing theorem provers often contain much more significant notions of proof reconstruction. For example, the Boyer-Moore theorem prover attempts to fill in significant gaps between lemmas using various proof procedures parametrized by the collection of previously proved lemmas [BM79] . If the proof procedure is not able to fill in a gap in a sequence of lemmas, the user must design some additional lemmas to split up that gap into more manageable parts. Other theorem provers, particularly those based on the LCF framework [GMW79] , allow functional programs (usually in a variant of ML) to be executed in order to compute ways to complete the gaps between lemmas (or between hypotheses and goal). In other systems, an interactive theorem prover might call a completely automated prover in order to complete a step of inference: for example, Isabelle can call the Vampire theorem prover to close a gap in a user's proof attempt [Men15] .
The community of logic programming
Oddly enough, the community that has invested a great deal of energy into providing effective implementations of logic-namely, the logic programming community-has not traditionally been involved with proof checking. There are at least three likely reasons for this mismatch between that community and those interested in theorem proving and proof checking.
Efficiency versus soundness
In proof checking, logical soundness is everything: there is no reason to be doing proof checking if one is not confident that the underlying logic engine is logically sound. The logic programming community has often emphasized efficiency instead of logical soundness: for example, many Prolog systems have not supported the occurs-check in unification since that was seen as a feature only needed for toy examples [Per88, Section 3.3] . Experience with automated theorem proving shows, however, that soundness of inference critically depends on the presence of occurs-check in unification. Of course, a programming language like Prolog can still be used to implement proof checkers even when unification is unsound since any programming language can be used to build, in principle, any programming task. One would suspect, however, that logic programming languages should have a much more immediate and transparent ways to support the effective implementation of logic.
Lack of logical expressiveness
Another aspect of most logic programming languages is that they do not have direct support for quantified formulas and the concomitant operations of substitution and unification involving expressions containing bindings. While individual Prolog clauses are interpreted as universally quantified, such quantification is implicit. Furthermore, no direct and logical support for bindings is available within Prolog even though the interplay between formula-level bindings (quantifiers) and term-level bindings (λ-abstractions) has been well understood since Church's introduction of the Simple Theory of Types [Chu40] . Thus, while Prolog provides many logical principles that could be used to implement proof checkers for propositional logic, that support does not readily extend to quantification logic.
Lack of abstractions
There is still at least one other reason that logic programming can be a poor match with proof checking: most Prolog systems do not support rich forms of abstractions, such as abstract datatypes and procedural (higher-order) abstraction. Each of these features were explicitly introduced into the first design and implementation of the functional programming language ML because they contributed to the correctness of the LCF proof checking system built using ML [GMW79] . For example, one way to generate theorems is to start with axioms and then to repeatedly apply inference rules to them. Thus the set of theorems can be encoded as the type thm with the axioms encoded via constructors and the inference rules via functions (from, for example, thm to thm). The act of declaring the type thm to be an abstract datatype causes the internal structure of that type to be hidden and this makes it impossible for there to be any other (possibly unsound) method for constructing a theorem. Similarly, higher-order programming in ML was introduced to allow for certain "kernel" operations (the tacticals) to have their trusted code separated from the "clients" code (the tactics).
The lack of expressiveness and abstraction can be addressed within logic programming if one is willing to move beyond first-order Horn clauses into fragments of higher-order, intuitionistic logic [Mil90] . In fact, λProlog [DGCT15, MN12, NM99] and Twelf [PS99] are two logic programming languages that treat bindings in expressions and proofs directly as part of their logical foundations. Furthermore, λProlog also exploits features of its underlying logic to provide logically sound notions of modules and abstract datatypes as well as higher-order programming.
Where should we look to find a significant and mature framework for linking the logic programming paradigm with proof checking? Remarkably, one has to look no further than the recent proof theory literature (see references in Sect. 3) to find a framework where relations and not functions dominate, where bounded backtracking search has obvious and immediate applications, and where term-level, formula-level, and proof-level abstractions occur naturally together. In addition, the topic of proof theory presents a mathematical and not a technological notion of proof.
Proof theory as a framework
If a modern theorem prover outputs a proof as a (persistent) document, that proof document is usually based on specific technology built into the prover. On some other occasions, provers output documents meant for tracing and debugging. It is the exceptional theorem prover that outputs a document that is intended to outlast the (version of the) prover itself. 1 Given the existence of the mathematical literature on proof theory initiated by Frege and Gentzen, proofs-as-documents can be as technology-free and eternal as Peano numerals:
Once proofs are liberated from the technology that produces them, then they can be checked by independently constructed checking programs which can be written by anyone keen to develop their own trusted base of code instead of adopting someone else's code. Once checked, such proofs can be placed in libraries that survive changes in theorem proving and proof checking technologies. Thus, proofs can be used to communicate trust between different provers and across changes in technology. In order to reach such a status in the sharing and trusting of proofs, we probably need to design a framework based on a mathematically well defined and sophisticated notion of proof. Examining the literature on proof theory, however, reveals a number of formally defined proof structures from which to chose. In the earliest days, Frege and Hilbert proposed rather simple, linear proof structures; Gentzen introduced both the sequent calculus as well as natural deduction; later, resolution refutations and tableaux proof systems were also introduced, in part, to support automation of theorem proving. Still other structures can be accepted as proofs, such as proof nets, matings, deep inference, and winning strategies.
In this paper, I outline a research program that proposes to use the sequent calculus as the assembly language of proof and to describe how to compile many other higher-level notions of proof into that assembly language. The formal device for defining the meaning of proof languages will be based on the notion of focused sequent calculus proofs for first-order classical and intuitionistic logics. I describe such a proof system in the next section.
Focused versions of sequent calculi
The sequent calculus of Gentzen provides an appealing form of formal proof structure since it can be used to describe proofs in classical, intuitionistic, and linear logics. They also support propositional, first-order, and higher-order logics and do so in a modular and clear fashion. The cut-elimination theorem [Gen35] also reveals that this notion of proof supports sophisticated manipulations (such as substitution and composition of proofs). On the other hand, the proofs in the sequent calculus can be chaotic: if a proof of a given sequent exists, many trivial and not-so-trivial variations of that proof also exist. All these variants work to hide structure. Relying on the small inference steps that are part of Gentzen's presentation of the sequent calculus makes not only finding sequent calculus proofs difficult but also communicating them challenging. Consider attempting to find a proof of the sequent
where contains, say, a hundred formulas. The search for a (cut-free) proof of this sequent can confront the need to choose from one-hundred-and-one introduction rules. If we choose the right-side introduction rule, we will then be left with, again, a hundred-and-one introduction rules to apply to the premise. Thus, reducing this sequent to, say, (q t s) requires picking one path of choices in a space of 101 4 choices [BM15] . Clearly, we must be able to do much better at exploiting the sequent calculus.
One of the first attempts to use sequent calculus in computer science needed to develop a normal form of sequent calculus proof that discarded a great deal of possible proofs while retaining those with useful structure. The uniform proofs of [Mil90, MNPS91] -with their alternating phases of goal-reduction and backchaining-was used to provide a proof-theoretic foundation for the logic programming paradigm. With the advent of linear logic [Gir87] , that two phase structure was extended to all of linear logic using Andreoli's focused proof system [And92] and the notion of polarity [And92, Gir91] . Soon afterwards, various focused proof systems for intuitionistic logic [CPP08, DL07, Her95, How98] and classical logic [DJS95, Gir91, Lau02] appeared. The LJF and LKF proof systems of [LM09] provide a framework and generalization to these various classical and intuitionistic focused proof systems.
I limit our attention here to first-order classical logic. A similar development holds for intuitionistic logic as well (in particular, see [CMR16] ). In the next several subsections, I describe the key elements of the LKF proof system. Note that descriptions of inference rules are usually given by reading their effects on sequents by moving from their conclusion to their premises: this is opposite to Gentzen's original reading of inference rules. Thus, introduction rules are viewed as methods for decomposing a formula in its conclusion and the initial inference rule is understood as terminating the bottom-up search for a proof. 
Polarizing connectives
The emphasis on focused proofs is an emphasis on proof structure and not provability. For example, consider the following different ways to write the introduction rules for disjunction and conjunction in a one-sided sequent system.
Given that the structural rules of weakening and contractions are available in classical logic, the first pair of rules and the second pair of rules are inter-admissible inference rules: any sequent provable with one element of the pair is provable also with the second member of the pair. Note also that the first member of each pair is invertible while the second member is not invertible. People presenting proof systems for classical logic or who are implementing such systems generally pick one member from each pair and that choice is usually the invertible rule. Given our interest here in proof structures (and not just provability), our eventual focused proof system will contain all four of these introduction rules. They will be distinguished from each other by having them introduce different polarized versions of disjunction and conjunction.
The introduction rules for the negative polarized connectives (∧ − and ∨ − ) are invertible while the introduction rules for the positive polarized connectives (∧ + and ∨ + ) are not invertible. The units for these connectives are also polarized similarly: t − , t + , f − , and f + , and these have the following introduction rules.
, t
(There is no introduction rule for the positive false f + .) Some connectives have fixed polarity: universal quantification is negative and its de Morgan dual, existential quantification, is positive. Atoms can be either positive or negative: this choice can be made in an arbitrary but fixed fashion. The negated atom ¬A has the opposite polarity to A. A formula has positive or negative polarity depending only on its top-level logical connective (if it has one) or on the polarity as a literal.
This use of the terms "positive" and "negative" when referring to polarity should not be confused with the use of these terms when referring to occurrences of subformulas within formulas. In particular, the fact that B has a negative occurrence in the formula B ⊃ C is independent of whether or not B has a positive or negative polarity. All polarized formulas have a polarity that can be determined from examining only its top-level structure.
Grouping don't-care and don't-know non-determinism
If several invertible rules can be applied to yield a given sequent then those rules can be applied in any order and, in fact, in all possible orderings to yield a proof. In order to factor away such don't-care non-determinism, the notion of the ⇑-phase is introduced into focused proof construction: in particular, the invertible rules are displayed as follows.
Here, sequents are of the form ⇑ , where is a schematic variable ranging over multisets of formulas and is a schematic variable ranging over lists of formulas. A list is used here instead of a multiset as a way to reduce the don't-care non-determinism: introduction rules are only applied to the first formulas in that list. In the ∀-introduction rule, the † proviso is the usual one: the variable y is not free in the lower sequent. In the store rule, C is a positive formula or negative literal: this rule is responsible for recognizing that the first formula in the right-hand context cannot be introduced by an invertible inference. In general, the context contains only positive formulas and negative literals.
A second phase within focused proofs contains sequents of the form ⇓ B where is as before and B is a formula. The introduction rules associated to this phase are written as follows.
Note that the non-invertible introduction rules for disjunction and existential quantification are part of this phase. Consider proving the following LKF sequent of a polarized version of an earlier example, namely,
The only way to prove this sequent is to perform introductions of the (positively polarized) formulas on the right of the ⇓: interleavings with introduction rules for other formulas in is not possible until this phase is completed.
Identity and structural rules
The identity inference rules of initial and cut are given as follows.
Here, P a a positive literal and ¬B is the negation normal form of the negation of B . Finally, the following two structural rules are needed to move between the two phases.
Here, P is a positive formula and N a negative formula. The release rule stops the ⇓ phase when it encounters a formula intended to be processed by the other phase: i.e., this rule releases the focus. The decide rule picks a formula on which to focus once all invertible rules have been completed. The only time the contraction rule is used in the LKF system is in this inference rule: as a result, it is only positively polarized formulas that are contracted.
Synthetic inference rules
One of the purposes of introducing a focused proof system is to make the following identification: the phases introduce new, synthetic inference rules. Gentzen's introduction and structural rules form the assembly instructions of proof and the synthetic inference rules form the higher-level notions of proof. For example, assume that all atomic formulas have positive polarity and assume that contains the formula a ∧ + b ∧ + ¬c. A derivation that decides on this formulas as its final inference rule must have the following shape.
This derivation is possible if and only if is of the form ¬a, ¬b, . Thus, the "macro-rule" is ¬a, ¬b, ¬c, ⇑ · ¬a, ¬b, ⇑ · Such macro-rules or synthetic inference rules are also called bipoles in the literature and they result from placing one ⇓-phase below one ⇑-phase. Such synthetic inference rules have sequents of the form ⇑ · for both their conclusion and their premises.
Soundness and completeness of focusing
The formulas used in classical logic are unpolarized while those in the LKF proof system are polarized. In order to state soundness and completeness of focusing, we must introduce the notion of polarizing a formula. Given the unpolarized formula B , letB be one of the exponentially many formulas that result by placing + or − on the occurrences of ∧ and ∨ (and their units t and f ) as well as attributing polarization to atoms. The soundness theorem for LKF is immediate: if ·⇑B has an LKF proof, a proof in Gentzen's LK proof system [Gen35] can be recovered from the LKF proof by replacing the ⇑ and ⇓ with commas, deleting some repetitions of sequents, and dropping the + and − annotations on the propositional connectives. Conversely, completeness (which is proved in [LM09] ) states that if B is a first-order theorem andB is any polarization of B then · ⇑B is provable in LKF. It follows from soundness and completeness that if any polarization of B is provable in LKF then every polarization of B is provable in LKF. Clearly, polarization is not relevant to provability but is relevant to the structure of proofs.
Foundational proof certificates
The two phases in LKF are strikingly different. The invertible ⇑-phase can be built from the bottom up as a purely deterministic computation: one just applies the inference rules in the straightforward fashion in a left-to-right order. On the other hand, the ⇓-phase is not straightforward since some of the inference rules need information that is lacking from the conclusion: in particular, the ∃ introduction rule requires a substitution term and the ∨ + introduction rule requires an indicator of whether to select the left or right disjunct. If this information is lacking, then the construction of this phase of the proof can be seen as a non-deterministic computation, where choices and substitution terms are guessed.
It is now easy to see that the focused proof system in Sect. 3 provides a communication protocol between an entity that possesses some evidence that a formula is a theorem and a low-level tool attempting to build a sequent calculus proof of that proposed theorem.
One way to implement such a protocol is to instrument the focused proof system LKF with certain augmentations as shown in Fig. 1 . The augmentation is accomplished in three simple steps: (i) a proof certificate term, denoted by the syntactic variable , is added to every sequent; (ii) every inference rule of LKF is given an additional premise using either an expert predicate or a clerk predicate; and (iii) the multiset of formulas to the left of the arrows ⇑ and ⇓ is replaced with a multiset of pairs of an index and a formula. The resulting proof system is called LKF a . Clearly, the LKF proof system can be recovered from LKF a by removing all occurrences of the syntactic variable and by removing all premises with a subscripted e or c as well as replacing all occurrences of tuples such as l , B with just B . As a result, it is immediate that no matter how one specifies the clerk and expert predicates or the actual structure of certificate terms and indexes, the LKF a proof system is always sound.
Fig. 1. The augmented LKF proof system LKF a
Note that the extra premise added to invertible rules are called clerks: in such inference rules, only simple computations are done and, in general, no information in a certificate term needs to be consumed.
On the other hand, the extra premise added to non-invertible rules are called experts: these predicates are responsible for examining certificates and, possibly, extracting information from them. Expert predicates may also to be non-deterministic: for example, it might be the case that both ∨ e ( , , 1) and ∨ e ( , , 2) holds. In this case, the expert could be seen as making a guess.
Depending on exactly how one defines and uses certificate terms, indexes, and the clerk and expert predicates (e.g., ∧ c (·, ·, ·), ∃ e (·, ·, ·), etc), the LKF a inference rules can be directed to build widely varying proof structures. Collecting together such definitions yields what is called a foundational proof certificate (FPC): an example FPC shall be presented shortly.
The kernel of a proof checker as a logic program
It is possible to see the inference rules in Fig. 1 as describing a logic program: in particular, Fig. 2 contains part of a λProlog specification for several of those rules. The first five lines of Fig. 2 declare some of the types, constants, and predicates used to encode first-order polarized (LKF) formulas; the next seven lines declare the types and predicates of the clerk and expert predicates; the next three lines provide the type declaration of the predicates that form the core of the proof checking kernel; and the remaining lines contain six clauses that are a direct specification of six inference rules from Fig. 1 : specifically of the inference rules for introducing ∧ − , ∀, and ∃, and the rules for store, decide, and initial. All the remaining augmented inference rules can be specified in a similar fashion.
The specification in Fig. 2 exploits two features of λProlog that are not directly available in Prolog. Both of these features arise in λProlog simply because its underlying logical foundation is more expressive than the Horn clauses foundations of Prolog [MN12] .
Bindings in formulas and proofs. λProlog encodes bindings in formulas (quantifiers) and in proofs (eigenvariables) directly and implements them into its unification and substitution mechanisms. For example, if x is a variable of type i and if b is a term of type form (that may contain x free) then λProlog provides the λ-abstraction of x over b written as (x\b): that is, the λ-abstraction is written using infix instead as prefix notion. The two constants all and some that are used to denote the (object-level) universal and existential quantifiers are declared to have the second-order type (i -> form) -> form. Thus, the constant all can build a term of type form if it is given such a lambda abstraction: thus, the term of type form that is written as (all x\b) denotes the universal quantification of x over b. λProlog follows the convention used by Church in [Chu40] that all bindings are encoded as λ-bindings. In a similar fashion, the universal quantifier that is written in the second clause of Fig. 2 is composed of the symbol pi (a convention also taken from [Chu40] ) and the λ-binding x\. Context management and its dynamics during proof search. Focused and augmented sequents contain a context denoted by the syntactic variable : this context is treated as a multiset of pairs of indexes and formulas. But, in fact, this context only needs to support the following operations: add a pair to the multiset (the store rule) and select a formula (non-deterministically) from the multiset by providing an index (the decide and initial rules). Note that we do not need to know how many members there are in nor anything about possible orderings between pairs. Note also that no functional dependency is assumed to hold between indexes and formula: that is, many formulas may be associated to the same index within a given context. For all these reasons, the hypothetical context found in λProlog serves as a direct implementation of these contexts. For example, the fourth clause in Fig. 2 employs the availability of implications in goals (written as =>) to add an item to the context. By forging such a direct link between a proof checking kernel and a logic program, that kernel has access to backtracking search and unification, which means that such a kernel implementation can perform proof reconstruction: if a proof certificate does not contain all the details necessary to complete a (sequent calculus) proof, then it should be possible to allow backtracking and unification to discover some of them.
The full process of defining and checking a certain format of proof evidence can now be done as follows.
D. Miller
FPCs have been defined for numerous proof systems in classical and intuitionistic first-order logics, including resolution refutations and paramodulation [CMR13, Mil11b] , Frege-Hilbert proofs structure [CMR13, CMR16] , oracle strings [CMR16, NR01] , typed λ-calculus [CMR13] , and equality and rewriting proofs [CM16] . Many other styles also seem possible to define. Most of these formats can be checked using the Checkers implementation of FPCs [CLR15] . Work has also started in making use of this framework to check proof certificates within modal logic [MMV16, MV15] .
Non-determinism in proof checking
In general, clerk predicates are intended to be functional: in the case of the conjunctive-clerk, this means that for every there exists at most one 1 and at most one 2 such that ∧ c ( , 1 , 2 ) is provable. One could insist that this is also the case with experts. For example, if the ∃ expert predicate is functional then for every for which ∃ e ( , , t) is provable, the continuation certificate and the substitution term t are uniquely determined. This can be achieved if, for example, the certificate simply stores this substitution term inside itself. While such proof certificates are clearly possible to design and check, storing all substitution instances will increase the certificate size and redundancy. If such substitution terms could be inferred from context using, say, the unification mechanism of logic programming, then the size of a proof certificate might be much smaller. Thus, allowing the proof checker to also reconstruct details of a proof allows proof certificates to be possibly much smaller in size.
For a specific example of the trade-off between proof size and proof checking, consider the following example (taken from [CMR13, CMR16] ). It is possible to convert some decision procedures into proof certificates. For example, consider the procedure for determining whether or not a given propositional formula is a tautology: first compute the conjunctive normal form of the formula and then check that all the resulting clauses contain complementary literals. It is an easy matter to define a proof certificate encapsulating this procedure. Following the four steps mentioned above, we choose to polarize the connectives in a propositional classical formula using the negative (invertible) connectives. We then arrive at the following code (which specifies the result of the second and third steps). Here, there is exactly one proof certificate-just the token cnf. Similarly, there is just one index-the token lit-which is used to index all stored formulas. Note that the only formulas stored in this way are (both positive and negative) literals. Thus, the association between indexes and formulas is not functional and, as a result, the decide rule will be asked to chose some formula with index lit for which a complement is found. Such a step works perfectly in a logic programming setting where the decide rule (on index lit) is immediately followed by the initial rule (on index lit): thus the decide rule will generate positive literals and the initial rule will test those against available negative literals. Note that if the indexing mechanism as well as the decide and initial experts were required to be functional, certificates would need to contain a great deal of indexing information: since there can be exponentially many clauses in the conjunctive normal form of a propositional formula, such certificates could be huge, in contrast to the description of the cnf certificate that is defined here.
Proof checking and model checking
The logics addressed above do not contain the principle of induction and, as a result, are too weak to encode even the simplest theorems of arithmetic. The lack of such a principle means that it will be difficult to design and check FPC based proof certificates generated by model checking systems and inductive theorem provers. Early in the 1990s, a couple of researchers working independently showed how it is possible to add fixed point definitions to logic and to add rules for unfolding fixed points to the sequent calculus [Gir92, SH93] . Still stronger proof systems, which include induction and coinduction as introduction rules for the least and greatest fixed point connectives, have been studied [Bae12, MM00, MT05] . Additionally, some of those strong proof systems have focused variants [Bae12, BM07] and these allow for a similar approach to defining clerks and experts and to building FPCs [BM15, HM15] .
To illustrate how inductive and coinductive inference rules can be added to sequent calculus, I introduce into logic the four symbols (equality), (inequality), μ (least fixed point), and ν (greatest fixed point), which will be treated as logical connectives (meaning that a sequent calculus proof system will give them introduction rules). The connectives and μ are positive polarized connectives while their duals and ν are negative polarized connectives. A formula in which all occurrences of logical connectives are polarized positively is called a purely positive formulas. The adj relation can be translated into the binary predicate · −→ · defined by
which uses only positive connectives. Note that the binder λ A is vacuous so this expression is logically equivalent to the expression that results from removing the prefix μ λ A. The predicate path can be encoded as the following logical expression denoted by path:
In general, it is sensible to view any predicate specified by Horn clauses as a purely positive least fixed point expression. { p 1 , a 1 , q 1 , . . . , p n , a n , q n } be encoded by the ternary relation · · −→ ·. This relation can be defined as a purely positive fixed point expression of the form
(Here, the disjunction is taken as positively polarized.) Similarly, since the labeled transition rules for CCS [Mil89] are naturally encoded as Horn clauses, that transition systems can similarly be represented as a purely positive formula. Given a labeled transition system defined in this way, the simulation and bisimulation relations can be defined as the following greatest fixed point expressions.
(Here, the implication B ⊃ C is encoded as ¬B ∨ − C .) Note that the second of these formulas contains an occurrence of both ∧ − and ∧ + . These formulas are not purely positive since they mix connectives of both negative and positive polarity. Just as logic programming can be described as proof search in a focused sequent calculus, model checking can be described as proof search in a proof system extended with such fixed point definitions. In particular, the Bedwyr model checking system [BGM + 07, TNM05] was designed to implement a direct reading of focused proof search in a logic with these logical connectives. (Bedwyr was also the first implementation of the ∇-quantifier [MT05] .) By replacing λProlog as the implementation language of proof checking kernels with Bedwyr, one can build proof checkers that are able to check additional proof certificates that arise from model checking and inductive theorem provers. For example, [HM15] shows how it is possible to treat a path in a graph as a proof certificate in a reachability problem; to treat a connected component as a proof certificate of nonreachability; to treat a (finite) bisimulation as a proof certificate of bisimilarity; and a Hennessy-Milner formulas as a proof certificate of non-bisimilarity.
The † proviso requires that θ is the mgu of s and t, and the ‡ proviso requires that s and t are not unifiable. Here, y stands for a fresh eigenvariable, s and t for terms, for a list of negative formulas, and P for a positive formula
Conclusion
As the connection between the LCF proof checker and the ML programming language [GMW79] illustrates, proof checking has played a role in the history and development of high-level languages. I have argued here that development continues and incorporates also the logic programming paradigm. There are, however, some challenges ahead for this close relationship to flourish. One such challenge is not compromising logical soundness for efficiency. The development of many logic programming languages has often favored efficiency and expressiveness over logical soundness: witness the presence of unification without the occurs-check, negation-as-failure, assert/retract, etc. Proof checking is a setting where logical soundness is paramount. While soundness can be delivered using unsound, quasi-logical processing, the logic programming community should certainly be able to deliver much more interesting and ambitious approaches to the implementation of logical deduction.
A second such challenge is achieving good performance during proof checking. Machine generated proofs in some domains can easily reach thousands and millions of lines of text. A recently reported machine-generated proof related to the Erdös discrepancy conjecture was contained in a file that was about 13 × 10 9 bytes (13 GB) in size [KL14] . While existing implementations of λProlog [DGCT15, NM99] are not capable of checking proof certificates of such size, the logic programming community has developed techniques (such as partial evaluation and various compilation methods) that should allow one to move from high-level logic specifications, such as those given here, to more narrow specifications with more effective implementations. For example, one of the proof certificates described in [KL14] is based on a resolution-style certificate for propositional logic. As a result, the mechanisms for dealing with bindings in formulas that are built into λProlog could be discarded to build an essentially Prolog-like checker for that proof.
A third such challenge is having powerful techniques for reasoning about logic programming specifications. It is possible to view provability from Horn clauses as a simple inductive definition (a feature that a number of theorem provers support), but more direct support seems desirable since provability has more properties than being just any inductive definition. In the case of logic programming with hypothetical reasoning and with bindings, as in λProlog, inductive reasoning is complicated. Fortunately, significant steps to address those complications have been made in the design and implementation of the Abella theorem prover [BCG + 14, GMN12] which is capable of reasoning directly with specifications like those found in λProlog. Thus, it should be possible to develop formal proofs of correctness for λProlog based proof checkers using Abella and related tools. 
